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This paper is a simple extension of the standard FDI model of Markusen and Horstmann
(1992). This latter predicts ￿rms would supply nearby markets with exports but far away
markets with FDI. Nevertheless, this does not match the spatial pattern in the data for many
home nations and industries. We propose a model with heterogeneous ￿rms where the spatial
pattern of FDI depends upon distance-linked communications costs as well as trade costs; the
resulting model lines up both with the aggregate knowledge-capital model evidence and the
￿rm-level evidence of Helpman-Melitz-Yeaple, while still allowing individual ￿rms to engage
in FDI in nearby markets while supplying distant markets via exports.
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11 Introduction
Markusen and Horstmann (1992) developed a model in which market structure is determined
endogenously as the outcome of plant location decisions by ￿rms. They incorporated multinational
￿rms (MNFs) into a general equilibrium trade model, where ￿rms bene￿t from internalization due
to increasing returns at the ￿rm level. Brainard (1993) followed a similar line of research in
focusing on the location decisions, and she proposed what has become the standard approach for
explaining horizontal multinational ￿rms, the so called proximity versus concentration hypothesis1,
or scale versus proximity. This hypothesis put in evidence the trade-o⁄ between the advantages
from locating near customers and from concentrating production in only one location (which gives
rise to scale economies at the plant level). In these models is more likely to be engaged in FDI
activities when trade costs are particularly high. Thus, foreign subsidiaries￿sales will be increasing
with distance. For the same reason, horizontal FDI are not encouraged by reduction in transport
costs. On the contrary, when trade costs fall, scale economy advantages can outweigh the bene￿t
from locating near customers. In this case, export activities could become more pro￿table.
Comparing this theory with the empirical evidence on FDI, we discover some discrepancies. In
fact, despite the reduction in transport costs across di⁄erent countries, there has been a consistent
growth of multinational sales, in particular of FDI in￿ ows. The data tells that multinational
enterprises account for a very signi￿cant fraction of world trade ￿ ows; and trade in intermediate
inputs between divisions of the same ￿rm constitutes an important portion of these ￿ ows (Hanson,
Mataloni and Slaughter, 2001). These data show a broad range of strategies that multinational
enterprises can undertake, highlighting the fact that the classical distinction of FDI as either
horizontal or vertical is partially misleading (Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter, 2001). Trade and
taxes are important policies which can a⁄ect the mix of a¢ liate strategies, other than the aggregate
a¢ liate activity. But also distance, meant not only as geographical distance but also cultural
di⁄erences, play an important role in the determination of the strategy chosen by the multinational
enterprise.
These empirical ￿ndings complicate the usual prediction based on proximity versus concen-
tration hypothesis. In fact, following this theory, the fall in trade costs should reduce FDI and
encourage exports. However, what appears from the data is something di⁄erent: the reduction
in trade costs coincided with FDI growth2 (Buch, Kleinert, Lipponer and Toubal, 2005; Carr,
1The proximity concentration trade-o⁄ predicts that "￿rms are more likely to expand their production horizon-
tally across borders the higher are the transport costs and trade barriers and the lower are investment barriers and
the size of scale economies at the level at the plant level relative to the ￿rm level" (Brainard, 1997).
2This seems to be con￿rmed in EU, where under the single market situation a reduction in the trade costs have
been achieved.
2Markusen, and Maskus, 2001). Other works stress the theoretical reasons why foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) into a host country may depend on the FDI in proximate countries (Blonigen,
Davies, Waddell and Naughton, 2006; Baltagi, Egger, Pfa⁄ermayr, 2006; Mayer and Head, 2004;
Mello-Sampayo, 2004).
In what follow we try to reconcile the MNFs theory with empirical ￿ndings by combining ￿rm
types and destinations, so that to explain the ongoing pattern of supply mode decisions. In order
to do so, we introduce the variation by ￿rms by markets as a new element with respect to the
existing literature where the variation is by market (homogeneous ￿rm) or by ￿rm in a single
market (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004). In this model we will have ￿rms switching type from
FDI to export in relation to distance: there would not be a one to one correspondence between
￿rm type and its characteristics. As far as we know there are no other papers that look to the
spatial implication of the location of FDI.
The paper "The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry
Productivity" by Melitz (2002), added two crucial elements to the new trade theory. The ￿rst is
the ￿xed market entry costs that a potential entrant has to pay. The second is heterogeneity in
￿rms￿productivity. By introducing ￿rm heterogeneity in the 1980￿ s Krugman model, he observed
how an increase in the exposure to trade leads to reallocation towards the more e¢ cient ￿rms,
without necessarily inducing an increase in the productive e¢ ciency of individual ￿rms3. His
￿ndings are supported by several micro-econometric studies.
After Melitz￿ s paper, the study of the implications of ￿rm level productivity di⁄erences has
become an important ￿eld of interest in international economics. In fact, the shift from the
representative ￿rm framework to the heterogeneous ￿rm framework has allowed to model some
aspects of international commerce that until now have only been studied empirically.
In line with this new research is the paper by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), "Exports
versus FDI". Here, the authors built a multi-country, multi-sectoral general equilibrium model
with the intent to analyze the decision of heterogeneous ￿rms to serve foreign markets either
through exports or local sales (FDI). Similar to Melitz (2002), they work with heterogeneous ￿rms,
identical nations, a single factor, but with more sectors. They ￿nd that ￿rm-level heterogeneity
plays a relevant role in explaining the choice between export and FDI ￿ ows. Their results rely on
the assumption of perfectly symmetric countries and on the absence of asymmetries in transport
costs or in ￿xed costs. As a consequence of this, a ￿rm that does export to one single country
will also export to every other country. This could limit our comprehension about reality, where
usually a ￿rm chooses a mixture of mode of supply.
3This result is partially contradicted by Baldwin et all (2004), where they pointed out that "although freer trade
improves industry productivity in a level sense, it harms it in a growth sense".
3Building on this literature, our purpose is to develop a theoretical model where we study the
e⁄ects of within-sectoral heterogeneity on the decision of ￿rms to supply foreign markets, in a
framework where distance plays a role. In order to do this we introduce some vertical linkages
within the FDI strategy. In particular, we let the production of the ￿nal good variety require
a combination of two intermediate goods. We claim that due to technological appropriability
issues one of the two intermediate goods can only be made at home. This makes market access
strategy through FDI to incur in trade costs: when a subsidiary is built abroad it has to import the
intermediate good from the mother located in the home nation. This linkage makes a portion of the
total marginal costs of selling via FDI rising with distance. Moreover, we assume there is a distance-
related travelling cost of workers from home to host country to coordinate the establishment of the
foreign a¢ liate; we call it communication cost. The communication costs as well as trade costs are
the key element of this paper. The interaction between these two can make the supply mode via
FDI not be convenient far away. Finally, the paper contributes in explaining the role of distance
in a⁄ecting industry volume of sales.
In the present analysis the works by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and Antras-Helpman
(2004) will be used; nevertheless, some interesting distinctions are introduced. Firstly, we give a
role to distance by introducing trade and communication costs in the MNF￿ s activity. Secondly,
we consider N symmetric countries located evenly around a circular trade route. The existence of
a circular route generates asymmetries, which are expressed in terms of di⁄erent country location
and therefore di⁄erent trade costs (this would imply that productivity will be not only ￿rm-speci￿c,
but also country-speci￿c). This element introduces a new level of heterogeneity, not only among
￿rms, but also among countries. This higher level of heterogeneity keeps the analysis closer to
reality. In fact, converse to the symmetric assumption in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (HMY),
which yields an equilibrium where if a ￿rm can engage in foreign market activity it will be active
in every foreign market4 independently of the distance, the introduction of spatial distribution of
￿rms gives a role to distance in determining the mode of supply decisions. This is in line with the
recent empirical ￿ndings which con￿rm that the number of multinational ￿rms is decreasing with
distance. Through this work we will show that spatial distribution of a¢ liates is much richer than
what the scale-versus-proximity model predict.
This paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 elaborates the model. Section 3 charac-
terizes its equilibrium and investigates the role of distance and the e⁄ects of trade liberalization.
Section 4 considers the e⁄ects of distance on sales. The last section concludes.
4In relation to its own productivity, it will be active as an exporters or as a subsisdiary.
42 Theoretical Framework
We study the mode of supply decision between FDI and export in a multi-country framework. For
this purpose, we merge the model by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) with Antras-Helpman
(2004). However, some interesting distinctions are introduced. Firstly, we give a role to distance
by introducing trade and communication costs in the MNF￿ s activity. Secondly, we consider N
symmetric countries located evenly around a circular trade route.
2.1 Preferences
Consumers in each country share the same preferences over two ￿nal goods: a homogeneous good,
z, and a di⁄erentiated good, x. We assume a two-tier preference with Cobb-Douglas in upper tier
and CES in the lower tier. A fraction of income, ￿, is spent on the di⁄erentiated good, x, and a










where ￿ > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution between any two products within the group
and V is the set of available varieties.
2.2 Supply
There are N identical countries located evenly around a circular trade route. We assume N to
be odd, so that starting from an origin country, there exist for every destination country, another
destination country located at the same distance (each destination has a clone). In this framework
we have two ￿nal goods, two intermediate goods and one factor. Each country is endowed with
labor, L, which is supplied inelastically.
There are two sectors, one homogeneous and one di⁄erentiated. The homogeneous sector, z,
produces a homogeneous good with constant returns to scale and perfect competition. In this
sector the technology is simple. We choose units of z such that one unit of labor is required
per unit of output. Thus, the unit cost function is w, where w is the wage rate for labor. This
unit cost function represents marginal and average costs. In the homogeneous sector, competition
determines price equal marginal costs, pz = w. It is convenient to choose good z as the numeraire,
so that pz = 1; hence, the pricing condition will become: 1 = w. As long as the homogeneous
good z is produced in every country and it is freely traded on international markets, the cost of
producing this homogenous good is equal in every country, and along with this, the wages.
The di⁄erentiated sector, x, produces a continuum of horizontally di⁄erentiated varieties from
5two intermediate goods (or tasks), y1 and y2. Both y1 and y2 are produced with one unit of labor,
but y1 can only be made at home, due to technological appropriability issues. Each variety is
supplied by a monopolistically competitive ￿rm which produces under increasing returns to scale
which arise from a ￿xed cost. As preferences are Dixit-Stiglitz, a single producer competes equally
with every other producer. As there are no costs of product di⁄erentiation, each ￿rm will produce
a di⁄erent type of variety.
We consider three modes of supply in the x-sector; ￿rms which sell only domestically (D-mode);
￿rms who export (X-mode), and ￿rms who supply the foreign market via FDI (M-mode). Hence,
when a ￿rm decides to serve the foreign market, chooses to export domestically produced goods,
or produce in foreign via a¢ liate production.
As in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), this choice is a⁄ected by the classical scale versus
proximity trade-o⁄. Nevertheless, in our model, geographical distance between countries matters
for separate reasons, namely trade and communication costs. The fact that y1 can only be made at
home plays an important role in an open economy situation. In this context, if a ￿rm chooses to
supply the foreign market via local sales of foreign a¢ liates the intermediate good realized using
foreign technology, y￿
1, cannot be considered a substitute for the intermediate good realized using
the home technology, y1. Every foreign a¢ liate must import the intermediate good y1 from the
home nation. This implies that the M-mode does not entirely avoid trade costs. We also assume
that workers from home must periodically travel to host country to coordinate ￿nal production.
This implies that there is a second distance-related cost that we call communication cost .
Following Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), entering the x sector involves a ￿xed variety-
development cost fI
5. Subsequently, each entrant draws a labor per unit output coe¢ cient (called
a) from a cumulative density function G(a), that is common to every country. The support of the
continuous random variable a is 0 ￿ a ￿ a0. Upon drawing its own parameter a, each ￿rm decides
to exit and not to produce (this happens if it has a low productivity draw), or to produce. In this
case, the ￿rm must face additional ￿xed costs linked to the mode of supply chosen. If it chooses to
produce for its own domestic market, it pays the additional ￿xed market entry cost, fD. If the ￿rm
chooses to export, it bears the additional costs fX of meeting di⁄erent market speci￿c standards
(for example, the cost of creating a distribution network in a new country). Finally, if the ￿rm
chooses to serve foreign markets through FDI6, there would be two types of ￿xed costs. First of
all, there is a ￿xed cost of creating a distribution network as well as building up new capacities
in the foreign country, fM. In addition to this ￿xed cost, we assume there is a distance-related
travelling cost of workers from home to host country to coordinate the establishment of the foreign
5Where I stands for innovation.
6Which in our model means only local production of the y2 intermediate good.
6a¢ liate. We call this f(d) and note that it rises with distance, d.
As mentioned, the homogeneous sector is not subject to trade costs, but the x-sector incurs in
iceberg costs7 proportional to round-the-circle distance. More precisely, in case of supply through
X-mode, the entire ￿nal good is subject to iceberg costs, while in case of M-mode only the inter-
mediate good y1, which has to be imported from home nation, is subject to iceberg costs. Selling
one unit in the export market j, would require shipment from country i of ￿ ￿ 1 units for the
exporting sector and ￿￿ for the FDI sector. Since FDI is a⁄ected by trade costs, its marginal cost
is increasing with distance, as will the distance-related communication cost.
In this framework, all ￿rms face a constant probability of death. This event is described by a
Poisson distribution with an hazard rate ￿ : in every period the ￿rm can be hit by this bad event
and forced to exit. For simplicity, we assume that there is no time discounting.
2.3 Intermediate Results
2.3.1 Demand








where P 1￿￿ is the CES price index, Ai8 and xi (v) represent the demand shifter and consumption
of typical variety v in country i. Ai is exogenous from the perspective of the ￿rm and composed
by the aggregate level of spending on the di⁄erentiated good in country i, ￿Ei; ni represents the
measure of varieties available in the country and pi(v) is the consumer price index of variety v.
The inverse demand function is given by





2.3.2 Organization and Product Variety
Given that fI have been paid, output of every variety is described by a Cobb-Douglas function of
the intermediate goods:
















, 0 < ￿ < 1 (3)
where a(v) is the ￿rm speci￿c marginal cost9, and ￿ is the Cobb-Douglas cost share of y1, common
across all nations. When trade is possible, ￿rms that produce decide whether to supply a particular
market and how, i.e. via export or FDI strategies. This will depend upon their own productivity
and trade costs. As mentioned before, the marginal costs in the exporting sector will be higher
than the one in the FDI sector. Hence, despite the existence of N symmetric countries, the fact
that they are located evenly around a circular trade route10 makes distance playing a role in the
consumer price. The trade cost is constructed in the following way: between the origin country
and the nearest destination country the trade cost is ￿; between the origin country and the second
nearest destination country, the trade cost is de￿ned as 2￿; between the origin country and the
third nearest destination country 3￿ and so on until the most distant country (N ￿ 1)=2 is reached,
here the trade costs is [(N ￿ 1)=2]￿. The condition in which we are interested in goes from the
destination country 1 step away from the origin to the destination country (N ￿ 1)=2 steps away
from the origin. We exploit the mirror image nature of the circle: countries (N ￿ 1)=2 to N ￿ 1
steps away are just a mirror image.
Since y1 and y2 are produced with L whose wage is unity, the marginal costs, mcDi , for local
production in home is11:
mcD = a(v)
where country symmetry allows us to drop the country subscript. The marginal cost for exporting
to a market that is d-steps away is:
mcX;d = a(v)d￿
where d and ￿ represent distance and trade cost respectively. Finally, the marginal cost for
supplying the d market via local sales of foreign a¢ liates is:
mcM;d = a(v)(d￿)
￿
Note that distance matters but only in relation to cost share, ￿, of the intermediate good y1 used
in the production of the ￿nal good. Using the mark up, ￿=(￿ ￿ 1), we can easily derive the price
for each particular mode of supply decisions.
91=a(v) represents the ￿rm speci￿c productivity parameter.
10Since countries are symmetric and located around a circular trade route, destination countries are labelled: 1,
2, 3... N-1.
11See appendix A1 for details of the cost minimization problem.
82.3.3 Mode of Supply Decisions
The mode of supply decision choice will involve the comparison of pro￿t levels taking account of
the various ￿xed and variable trade costs. A ￿rm can decide to: (i) not supply a market, (ii)
supply it via exports, or (iii) supply it via local sales of foreign a¢ liates. Of course, the local
market is supplied by local sales, if the ￿rm is active (iv).
For what concerns the foreign markets, the two types of distance related costs, d￿ and f (d),
imply that almost anything can happen. To focus on the central case, we assume parameters such
that we get the ranking as in HMY when there are only two nations. Namely, only ￿rms with
su¢ ciently high productivity supply the foreign market at all, with the most productive, supplying
it via FDI rather than exports. In this way our model is in line with the HMY empirical ￿ndings.
The regularity condition for this is:
fD < d￿
(￿￿1)fX < d￿
￿(￿￿1) [fM + f (d)]
The optimal mode of supply depends, as in HMY, on a ￿rm￿ s productivity. As described above,
four cases are relevant.
Case (i): The ￿rm decides not supply a market and exits.
Case (ii): The ￿rm decides to supply a market via exports, so the pro￿t from exporting to a
market that is d-steps away is:
￿X;d = [pX (v) ￿ a(v)d￿]x(v) ￿ fX (4)
Case (iii): The ￿rm decides to supply a market via FDI, so the pro￿t realized by a subsidiary
located in the d-steps away market is:
￿M;d = [pM (v) ￿ a(v)(d￿)
￿]x(v) ￿ f(d) ￿ fM (5)
where f(d) represents the ￿xed communication costs and (d￿)
￿ is the trade costs associated with
the intermediate good, y1, imported from the home country. The subsidiary located in the host
country has to face both the communication costs, which rise with distance, and the trade costs
that hit the imported intermediate.
Case (iv). The market under consideration is the ￿rm￿ s home market, so the pro￿ts for under-
taking D-mode supply are:
￿D (v) = [pD (v) ￿ a(v)]x(v) ￿ fD (6)
Using the intermediate results for optimal price we calculate the operating pro￿t for the three




















1￿￿ ￿ fD (7)
If a ￿rm chooses the X-mode for a given foreign market, then its equilibrium net operating
pro￿t on sales in that market is:
￿
￿
X;d(a;A;￿) = B (d￿a)
1￿￿ ￿ fX (8)
If a ￿rm chooses the M-mode for a given foreign market, then the equilibrium net operating






1￿￿ ￿ f(d) ￿ fM (9)
These pro￿t functions are depicted in Figure 1, which helps clarify the analysis.






















In this ￿gure, we represent how distance a⁄ects the modes of supply. On the horizontal axis we
have a1￿￿; since ￿ > 1, this variable can be used as a ￿rm-level productivity index. All the pro￿ts
described in (7), (8) and (9) are increasing functions of a1￿￿: The diagram plots ￿D, ￿X1 and ￿M1
which are the operating pro￿ts for a ￿rm supplying a market locally (￿D), or supply a market
1-step away (￿X1) or supplying the same market via M-mode (￿M1). Independently of the type of
activity, the more productive is a ￿rm, the more pro￿ts it will make. The pro￿t function ￿M1 is
slightly ￿ atter than ￿D, due to trade costs, and its vertical intercept is lower due to higher ￿xed
costs. The ￿gure also plots the pro￿ts for a market 2-steps away as ￿X2 and ￿M2. Consider ￿M2.
In this case, the slope of ￿M2 is ￿ atter than ￿M1 due to increase in trade costs and its vertical
intercept is lower due to the higher distant dependent communication cost, i.e. f(2) >f(1). The
pro￿t function ￿X1 is ￿ atter than ￿D due to trade costs. In the supply mode via FDI only a part
of the intermediate goods incurs in trade costs, this makes ￿M1 steeper than ￿X1; this condition
is preserved for any further increase in distance: ￿M2 is also steeper than ￿X2.
From Figure 1 we see that there exist di⁄erent productivity levels at which a ￿rm is indi⁄erent
between supply modes; these change with distance. The cuto⁄productivity level at which operat-
ing pro￿ts from domestic sales equal zero is a
1￿￿
D . The productivity levels at which exporters and




M;d. Greater distance will modify these cuto⁄s. For









These conditions are ensured by the regularity condition. If the a
1￿￿
X;d rises with the distance of
the market "d", we cannot say the same for a
1￿￿
M;d. In fact, a
1￿￿
M;d has an ambiguous behavior with
respect to distance, which depends on the freeness of trade. We cannot a priori rank the thresholds
for X versus M, nor for M at di⁄erent distances. More precisely, Figure 1 holds for su¢ ciently
high freeness of trade and distance.
2.4 Equilibrium Conditions
We now turn to formal statements of the thresholds illustrate in Figure 1.
2.4.1 The Cuto⁄ Conditions
Firms will choose the optimal supply mode for each market. To relate the choice to ￿rms￿marginal
cost we de￿ne a threshold marginal costs, a(v), for each destination and for each mode of supply.









That is ￿rms with a(v) below aD will ￿nd it optimal to supply their local market; ￿rms with
a(v) > aD expect negative pro￿ts and exit the industry.
The choice in foreign markets is more complex, so it could be helpful to structure the discussion
with the help of Figure 1. As we see from the ￿gure the net operating pro￿ts of supplying the
foreign market d-steps away, rises under both modes of supply. Firms with aX;d < a(v) < aD have
positive operating pro￿ts from sales in the domestic market, but they lose money if they choose to











Thus, only ￿rms with a(v) ￿ aX;d will consider export to the d market.
Notice, from Figure 1, that at a(v) = aX;d, exporting yields a higher net operating pro￿t then
















This M-mode cuto⁄ is obtained by equating the operating pro￿ts from doing FDI, (9) with the
operating pro￿t from doing export, (8). This because by construction, a ￿rm will choose to supply
the d-steps away country via FDI if and only if the FDI strategy is more pro￿table than the export
strategy, i.e. if this holds:
￿M;d ￿ ￿X;d ￿ f(d) + fM ￿ fX









= f(d) + fM ￿ fX
Notice that if a(v) ￿ aM;d, M-mode supply yields a higher net operating pro￿t.
From the diagram it is clear that aX;d > aM;d for every level of distance. Therefore, considering
Figure 1, when d = 2, both ￿M;d and ￿X;d become ￿ atter, but ￿X;d always by more. Hence, the
new crossing point de￿ning the new equilibrium M-mode cuto⁄, aM;2,will be at the right of aX;2
12.
Nevertheless, some ￿rms that were supplying market 1-step away via M-mode, switch to X-mode
as a consequence of higher trade costs and communication costs.
2.4.2 The Role of Distance
A key goal of our study is to characterize the spatial pattern of modes of supply. This is implicit
in the cuto⁄ conditions, but here we highlight the role of distance in explaining the variation by
￿rms by market. The pattern of organizational forms could be characterized in two main steps.
Markusen and Horstmann (1992) proposed a general-equilibrium model where MNFs arise due to
a market-access motive to substitute for export ￿ ows, or what is termed ￿horizontal￿FDI. Under
the assumption of high trade costs, they found export nearby and FDI far away; this result is also
called scale versus proximity result. More recently, HMY introduced ￿rms heterogeneity in the
pattern of organizational forms; here the nature of serving the market depends on the nature of
the ￿rm. Both papers are developed in a two-country framework. In the present work, the scale
versus proximity is used in a model with heterogeneous ￿rms and many locations, implying that
there would not be a one to one correspondence between ￿rm type and ￿rm characteristic. In this
context, a ￿rm could decide to supply via M-mode until a particular destination country, and then
when distance becomes too high, to switch to X-mode supply. In Figure 2 is shown the ￿rm level
12This derives from the regularity condition assumed.
13characteristics with multiple destinations.
Figure 2: Modes of Supply and Destinations
0
N-mode D-mode X-mode in 1
X-mode in 2 M-mode in 2
M-mode in 1
X-mode in 3 M-mode in 3












In Figure 2 we represent the variation by ￿rms by market with respect to the productivity level,
a1￿￿, assuming a certain level of distance and trade openness. In this ￿gure, we refer to the nearest
destination country using the label 1. The origin country can reach the other N-1 countries with







classical HMY model, where location does not play any role: if a ￿rm is doing FDI toward the
nearest destination country, country 1, is also doing FDI toward the other N ￿ 1 countries. For
this reason they consider types of ￿rm: X-type, M-type. In this paper a given ￿rm may ￿nd it
optimal to supply via exports to one market but via FDI to another, so we consider mode of supply
X-mode, M-mode by nation.
The existence of distance permits to highlight a new pattern. On the right hand side of a
1￿￿
M1
there is a new region which represents the spatial variation in M versus X mode supply, for each
￿rm. In this analysis a
1￿￿
D represents the minimum productivity level in order to supply the local
market; a
1￿￿
X1 is the minimum productivity level in order to become an exporter to country 1; a
1￿￿
M1
represents the productivity threshold in order to do FDI in country 1, and so on. These threshold
levels change with distance. In relation to its own productivity, a single ￿rm can undertake M-
mode supply toward country 1 and then X-mode supply toward country 2 through N-1. This
switching is determined by the increasing variable and ￿xed costs. Only the more productive ￿rm
will supply via local sales of foreign a¢ liates in every destination country.
14Remark 1 Under certain conditions, namely high distance and freeness of trade, the area on the
right hand side of a
1￿￿
M1 is shrinking the more important is distance. This implies that few ￿rms
will supply the far away market via FDI market access strategy. There exists a critical value of
d, speci￿c for each ￿rm, at which FDI strategy is not as pro￿table as export strategy. When this
critical level is reached this speci￿c ￿rm will undertake export activities, abandoning FDI.
Remark 2 If the above initial conditions are not respected, we will observe a switch from the
X-mode to the M-mode.
Remark 3 If we aggregate all foreign markets into one, we would observe the HMY association
between ￿rm level e¢ ciency and supply mode. However, considering a single ￿rm with e¢ ciency
(a0)
1￿￿, then we see that this ￿rm supplies nearby markets by M-mode, but further away markets
by X-mode.
It is also possible to consider Figure 2 in terms of export platform. More precisely, the area
after a
1￿￿
M1 could be interpreted in terms of export platform. As we said, when distance increases,
some ￿rms stop building foreign a¢ liates abroad and start to undertake export as a foreign market
access strategy. This export activity would be much cheaper if it take place between the last foreign
country where it has been built the foreign a¢ liate and the new destination country. This latter
case would imply an export platform strategy, where the foreign a¢ liate ￿rm located in country
j sells in that foreign domestic market, and also in third markets (j + 1;j + 2:::j + (N ￿ 1)=2)
through export.
2.4.3 Free Entry
It is possible to show the equilibrium which characterizes this economy. In order to do so, we need
to specify some other equilibrium equations, namely the free entry condition and the price index.
Free entry ensures equality between the expected operating pro￿ts of a potential entrant and
the entry cost, E (￿) ￿ fI. This condition holds for all type of ￿rms. The cumulative density
function is G(a), with support: [0;::: ;a0], where for simplicity we can set a0 = 1: The free entry














































￿ f(d) ￿ fM]dG(a)g = fI (13)
where ￿ = ￿1￿￿ is freeness of trade, ￿ = d1￿￿ and d is the parameter that takes into consideration
the di⁄erent country locations; ￿nally P 1￿￿ is a weighted average of the marginal costs of all ￿rms
active in the market. Let￿ s spend some more words on this term, P 1￿￿.
In every country this weighted average, P 1￿￿, is characterized by all the brands o⁄ered in that
particular country. Brands o⁄ered by domestic ￿rms, for which the consumer price is a￿=(￿ ￿ 1);
brands o⁄ered by foreign exporters, for which the consumer price is a￿d￿=(￿ ￿ 1); and ￿nally,
brands supplied by foreign subsidiaries, with consumer price a￿ (￿d)








































2.4.4 Parametrization: Pareto Distribution
The fact that the free entry condition and the price index depend on the probability distribution
implies that in order to have explicit solutions for this model, we need to assume a particular
functional form for G(a). Following the empirical literature on ￿rms size distribution (see Axtell
2001; Helpman et al. 2004), we use as an approximation, the Pareto distribution. The cumulative







where k and a0 are the shape and scale parameter, respectively. Note that k=1 implies a uniform
distribution on [0;a0]. The shape parameter k represents the dispersion of cost draws. An increase
16in k would imply a reduction in the dispersion of ￿rm productivity-draws. Hence, the higher is k
the smaller is the amount of heterogeneity.
The support of the distribution [0;:::;a0], is identical for every country, where a0 represents
the upper bound of this distribution. The productivity distribution of surviving ￿rms will also
be Pareto with shape k. More precisely, since a ￿rm will start producing only if it has at least
a productivity of 1=aD, the probability distribution of supplying as an exporter, or as a foreign
a¢ liate, is conditioned on the probability of successful entry in each market. Hence the truncated






where it is exploited the fractal nature of the Pareto. Here the support is [0;:::;aD]. Given the
assumed parametrization, we can explicitly solve P 1￿￿ and the free entry.
Price Index using the Pareto distribution
As we said, ￿rms will o⁄er a price only if they have at least a productivity of 1=aD. Hence, the
























where b = k
￿￿1; ￿ = ￿1￿￿; ￿ = (d)
1￿￿; T = fX=fD and Vd = (f(d)+fM ￿fX)=fD: In order for the
integral to converge we assume that b > 1.
Free entry condition using the Pareto distribution:






















1￿￿ (￿￿) ￿ fX)dG(a)] = fI (17)
3 General Equilibrium with N countries
In order to analyze the main implications of our model, we exploit the fact that all ￿xed coe¢ cients
are the same in every country and that the distribution function is the same. However, the
existence of N countries located evenly around a circular trade route introduces a role for distance
17in generating heterogeneity in the supply mode decisions within the same ￿rm. Using the expression
for the weighted average of the marginal costs in (16) inside the domestic cuto⁄ condition (10),































and ￿ could be consider as parameters that summarize the impact of the two types of trade barriers
on exports and FDI activities. In particular, ￿ represents the combined e⁄ect of higher ￿xed costs
and variable distance costs on export strategy. While ￿ measures the role of the di⁄erence in these
costs between a FDI strategy and an export strategy. Using ￿ and ￿; the expression for n￿ could




￿bfD [1 + ￿ + ￿]
(18)
The equilibrium number of ￿rms described by (18) represents the actual number of survivors in
each country, which decreases with ￿ and ￿, hence it decreases with higher ￿xed and variable
distance costs. Using the free entry condition in (17), and the cuto⁄ conditions in (10)-(12), we








































The index d inside these expressions is related to the geographical distance between the origin and
a speci￿c destination country.
Di⁄erently to Helpman et al. (2004), these cuto⁄s change in relation to the geographical
18location of the destination country. In fact, equations (19)-(21) change in relation to how many
countries belong to this trade bloc and more importantly, (20) and (21) change with respect to the
destination country we consider to reach. Since countries are evenly spaced along the circular trade
route, the above equations are the same for whatever country we pick to be the origin country.
Remark 4 The existence of di⁄erent country￿ s locations generates distance-dependent cuto⁄s.
Hence, the range of ￿rms choosing the M-mode is shrinking the more distant is the destina-
tion country to reach. Therefore, some ￿rms that are supplying the foreign country, j, via local
sales of foreign a¢ liates (M-mode), could be forced to supply country j + 1 via X-mode, where
d(j + 1) > d(j), .
3.1 The Impact of Trade
In the present framework, with N symmetric countries, we observe the e⁄ect of opening to trade.
Since fI does not change in the transition from autarky to trade, the free entry conditions are
left una⁄ected by trade: regardless of pro￿t di⁄erences across ￿rms (relative to X-mode or M-
mode), the expected value of future pro￿ts, in equilibrium, must equal the ￿xed investment cost
fI. Hence, as in Melitz (2002), the transition from autarky to open economy, will move up the zero
pro￿t condition curve: the exposure to trade induces an increase in the cuto⁄ productivity level
((1=aD)
T > (1=aD)
A)13. This will modify the productivity level of the least productive ￿rms. In
an open economy situation, a ￿rm with a productivity level between (1=aD)
A and (1=aD)
T cannot
earn positive pro￿ts and so will exit from the market. Moreover, as pointed out by Melitz, another
selection process acts: ￿rms with productivity level above 1=aX or above 1=aM enter respectively
as exporters or as subsidiary. These three e⁄ects are called domestic market selection e⁄ect, export
market selection e⁄ect and FDI market selection e⁄ect. These e⁄ects reallocate market shares
towards more e¢ cient ￿rms, and generate an increase in the overall productivity.
The transition toward the open economy situation generates a reduction in the number of
surviving ￿rms in every country14. The total number of ￿rms selling in every country includes:
total number of domestics ￿rms, foreign exporters and multinationals. The number of surviving
￿rms decreases as a consequence of the domestic market selection e⁄ect (aD #). However, as the
entrance of new foreign ￿rms more than compensate this reduction, consumers typically enjoy a
larger amount of varieties.
13Recall that in Melitz (2002) the ZPC are downward sloping and the FE conditions are upward sloping. However,
since here we consider the marginal costs, the slope of these curves will be the opposite.
14As in Melitz, n < nA, where nA represents the number of ￿rms in autarky.
193.2 The E⁄ects of Increase in Distance and Trade Liberalization
We now consider comparative statics with respect to d, N and ￿: we study how these elements
a⁄ect the equilibrium marginal costs. We have analytical solutions, but the analysis is facilitated
by graphing the changes with respect to d, N and ￿.
Increase in N and in Distance Since the domestic cuto⁄ does not depend on distance, we
examine the e⁄ect of a change in the dimension of the trade area, N. Then we consider the e⁄ect
of distance on the export cuto⁄s. These e⁄ects are unambiguous.
An increase in the overall dimension of the circle, N, implies a decrease in the domestic cuto⁄. In
fact, the increase in the dimension of the economic area generates an increase in competition, and
so in the expected pro￿ts. Moreover, the increase in distance between the origin and the destination
country makes more expensive to reach the destination country through export. Therefore, the
cuto⁄ of the exporting ￿rm is decreasing with distance. Hence, only the more productive ￿rms
can do export.
The e⁄ect of distance on MNF cuto⁄ is more complex; as mentioned in remark 2, it depends
20on the degree of openness:
If ￿ is su¢ ciently low, the MNF cuto⁄, aM;d, is a monotonic decreasing function of distance, d.
This implies that the increase in distance is making more di¢ cult to choose M-mode in order
to reach the foreign country. Di⁄erently, when ￿ is high, the MNF cuto⁄ function has not a
monotonous behavior: it increases for low level of distance and then it starts to decrease when
distance becomes important. A possible interpretation of this result is that large value of ￿ lower
the e⁄ects of distance on aM;d.
Increase in Trade Openness We now consider how a progressive exposure to trade a⁄ects the
supply mode decisions of ￿rms, via the e⁄ect on the equilibrium cuto⁄s conditions. An increase
in the exposure to trade, (￿ " or ￿ #), have similar e⁄ect to Melitz (2002), for what concern the
domestic and export ￿rms,
The domestic cuto⁄ is decreasing as a consequence of the market selection e⁄ect, and the export
cuto⁄ is increasing as a consequence of the reduction in ￿. More complex results are obtain for
21what concern the MNF cost cuto⁄:
For low level of distance, the MNF cost cuto⁄ is not a monotonic function of ￿. It increases for
low level of ￿, and then it decreases. Hence, when distance is not too high, an initial increase in
trade openness makes easier to become a MNF. However, a further increase in the trade openness,
makes the foreign market strategy too costly: the productivity required to supply via M-mode is
now increasing with ￿. On the contrary, when distance is su¢ ciently high, the MNF cost cuto⁄ is
a monotonic increasing function of phi. This last result con￿rms the classical MNF theory.
Number of Firms Also the equilibrium number of ￿rms does not depend on distance; therefore
we examine the e⁄ect of a change in the dimension of the trade area, N and in trade openness, ￿,
on the number of active ￿rms:
As a consequence of the increase in competition (N "), the number of active ￿rms is decreasing
with N. In the same way, a further exposure to trade reduces the number of active ￿rms, as a
consequence of the increase in domestic productivity cuto⁄ (market selection e⁄ect).
223.3 Welfare E⁄ects of Trade Liberalization
From the indirect utility function we can examine the welfare of consumers. Since the indirect
utility function15 is given by V = ￿E=P, where P is the standard CES price index, we can examine
the welfare e⁄ects simply by examining how P is changing. A greater openness will increase the
welfare by lowering the price index16, as well as a decrease in the domestic cuto⁄. Instead, a higher
distance increases the price index, lowering welfare.
4 Distance and Aggregate Sales
In the following part we will use the analysis presented in Kleinert and Toubal (2006) in order to
consider the role of distance on volume of sales. Following the standard scale versus proximity
hypothesis, horizontal FDI is chosen when ￿rms prefer to produce abroad through foreign a¢ liates
so to save on trade costs. Hence, in the classical FDI framework we observe foreign a¢ liates￿sales
increase with trade costs. However, empirical ￿ndings based on aggregate data (Buch et al. 2005;
Carr et al. 2001) ￿nd a negative relationship between a¢ liate sales and distance17. In order to
￿ll this gap, we model a FDI activity which involves a local production of one intermediate good,
y2, and the imports of another intermediate good, y1; so that it is possible to analyze how a¢ liate

































The ￿rst term, (aM;d=aD)
k, represents the cumulative probability of ￿rms in the origin country to
own an a¢ liate in the destination country. As we brie￿ y mentioned in the previous section, if we
multiply this term with the total mass of active ￿rms from the origin country, n￿G(aM;d=aD), we
obtain the number of a¢ liates in the destination country. The remaining part of that expression
represents average sales. Since we are dealing with N symmetric countries, and so with N-1 possible
15Without loss of generality, in this welfare analysis we are only concerned about the di⁄erentiated good.
16It can nevertheless happen that when trade costs are high and the number of foreign activities is strictly greater
than the number of domestic ￿rms, the e⁄ect of product varieties on welfare is negative (Melitz, 2002).
17In these empirical works, distance is used as a proxy for tranportation costs.























Without loss of generality, in the exercise of comparative static, we consider only two countries;
the analysis could be extended to N-1 countries, but the conclusions will not change. In observing
the change in a¢ liate sales as a consequence of a change in d, we should keep in mind that the




































In the above expression we can see that distance a⁄ects SA through a direct and an indirect e⁄ect.
For what concern the direct e⁄ect, we see from (24) that there is a negative relationship between
SA and d. On the contrary, we have more ambiguous results for what concern the indirect e⁄ect. In
particular the ambiguity is linked to the sign of the last partial derivative, @aM;d=@d. Equation (24)






, while it is negatively related with the average size of foreign a¢ liates. Di⁄erentiating



















The threshold marginal cost of being a MNF, aM;d, is positively related to aggregate a¢ liate sales.
Let￿ s now analyze the other partial derivative in the second order e⁄ect of (25), i.e. the e⁄ect of
distance on productivity. What is the sign of @aM;d=@d ? Firstly, we use the net operating pro￿ts













￿ ￿ (￿￿)] ￿ f(d) ￿ fM + fX
24where any particular functional form for f(d) is assumed. Solving this expression by the threshold
marginal cost, aM;d, we get:
aM;d =
￿












































The sign of the ￿rst term is straightforward: since ￿ > 1; the sign is negative; instead, the second
term is more di¢ cult to interpret. In fact, the sign of this second term depends on the behavior











More precisely, the sign of this term is related to the degree of trade openness18. For low level
of trade openness, (27) is always negative. If it is so, the sign in the second bracket in (26) is
positive19; thus the overall sign of (25) is negative: the a¢ liate sales are unambiguously decreasing
with distance for low level of trade openness. When ￿ starts to increases the sign of (25) is not so
straightforward anymore, since the partial derivative @aM;d=@d could be positive. For su¢ ciently
high trade openness and su¢ ciently small distance, the sign of (27) will be positive; hence the
overall sign of (25) depends on the magnitude of its ￿rst and second term. However, when distance
is not so small, the sign of (25) turns again to negative, since (26) is now negative.
It seems interesting to notice some peculiarities linked to higher level of trade openness. The
change in the sign of (26) depends on the degree of trade openness. For example, when ￿ is very
high, the change in the sign of (26) occurs at a higher level of distance than for a lower ￿. Therefore,
since overall aggregate sales are positively related to the threshold marginal cost, we conclude that
18See Appendix 2 for a graphical representation.
19With respect to the second bracket, since the communication costs are increasing with distance and the de-
nomitator is smaller in the second ratio, the second term is bigger than the ￿rst.
25when trade barriers are su¢ ciently high, aggregate sales are decreasing in distance: the overall
e⁄ect of distance on SA is negative. However, the magnitude of this reduction is strictly linked
to the level of trade openness. Hence, when distance is su¢ ciently high, we expect more ￿rms
choosing to supply via X-mode. The size of the reduction in a¢ liates￿sales and so of the increase
in export strategies, becomes bigger the more distant is the a¢ liate￿ s locations. This results is in
line with recent empirical ￿ndings.
Remark 5 The reduction in a¢ liate sales due to increase distance is more relevant the less open
is trade.
It could be interesting to turn our attention to the role of distance on export activity, so as
to compare the e⁄ect of distance on M-mode supply versus X-mode supply. Since export sales
are a⁄ected by a combination of aM;d and aX;d, we expect a complex relationship between SX and
distance. In order to put in evidence the e⁄ect of distance, we ￿rst de￿ne the aggregate export
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(29)
In what follows we con￿rm the sign of the above partial derivatives. Deriving SX with respect to






































As expected, export sales are increasing in the threshold marginal cost of being an exporter, aX;d,
and decreasing in aM;d. In order to analyze the relationship between aggregate export sales and
26distance, we will use the net operating pro￿ts, so to derive the e⁄ect of distance on both the
threshold aM;d and aX;d. We already know from the analysis above that the sign of @aM;d=@d could
be ambiguous: it depends on the degree of trade openness. Thus, as long as distance is not too
small the cuto⁄marginal cost aM;d is negatively a⁄ected by distance, hence @aM;d=@d < 0. On the



















the e⁄ect of distance, d, on the cuto⁄ marginal cost aX;d is unambiguously negative. What could
be concluded? Similarly to what we found for a¢ liate sales, the amount of aggregate exports
does not linearly depend on distance. The e⁄ect of distance on SX depends on the magnitude of
the partial derivatives in (29). Nevertheless, when @aM;d=@d > 020, since the sign of (31) will be
positive, the overall sign of (29) will be negative. The economic intuition behind this result is that,
for high trade openness and low distance, the result of a slight increase in distance between the
destination and the origin countries, it causes a decrease in the amount of export sales. Hence,
when distance does not play an important role and trade is su¢ ciently open, the result obtained
could be considered as a con￿rmation of the scale versus proximity hypothesis. On the contrary,
when distance becomes important we cannot have a precise conclusion, because the second term
in (29) will be positive, since @aM;d=@d < 0. For high level of distance, if the ￿rst and the third
terms in (31) are smaller than the second term, the overall sign of that expression will be positive;
meaning that when distance plays an important role the export sales are increasing with distance.
To conclude:
Remark 6 Under certain circumstances, namely su¢ cient trade openness, high distance and im-
portant reaction of SX to changes in aM;d, export sales are increasing with distance.
5 Conclusion
The paper analyses the choice between di⁄erent supply modes in a framework where the existence
of intermediate goods makes MNF activities a⁄ected by trade and communication costs. Some
asymmetries between countries, in terms of di⁄erent country locations, are assumed. The produc-
tion of the ￿nal good variety is assumed to depend on a particular intermediate good combination.
20When trade is su¢ ciently open and distance su¢ ciently low, the sign of @aM=@d will be positive
27This assumption makes the total marginal costs of selling via FDI rising with distance. More-
over, we considered FDI activities as characterized by ￿xed costs which raises with distance. The
existence of intermediate goods and communication costs leads to a result in which the choice
of engaging in FDI activities is strictly a⁄ected by distance. In particular, in line with recent
empirical works, we are able to show a richer pattern of modes of supply the foreign markets.
We found that distance modify the equilibrium cuto⁄s. In particular, we highlight a process
through which for increasing level of distance the same ￿rm can supply via M-mode some markets
and via X-mode others. The magnitude of this process increases with distance. This work put in
evidence that under certain conditions MNF activities will be nearby concentrated; whereas export
activities become more convenient far away. This result relies on the role of the communication
costs and the intermediate goods. We also found the conditions which make the aggregate a¢ liate
sales decreasing with distance, and the amount of exports increasing with distance. This result is
also consistent with the recent empirical ￿ndings.
The existence of "adequate skills￿in the host country plus the availability of su¢ ciently de-
veloped communication technologies, would have changed the situation. In that case, MNF ￿rms
could ￿nd convenient outsourcing parts of the production process to foreign countries. The pres-
ence of "adequate skills￿ would allow a more e¢ cient (time-saving) transmission of knowledge
across countries, permitting to the MNFs to avoid communication and trade costs. Nevertheless,
at least in this paper, our interest is limited to the case in which a special case of horizontal FDI
is undertaken. A possible extension of this work could be to introduce some elements of contract
theory in the contest of the o⁄shoring relationship. So that it could be possible to analyze this
framework from a di⁄erent perspective. For example, we could ask what is the pro￿t maximizing
way for ￿rms to organize their activities? Do ￿rms prefer internally produce the intermediate
goods or to outsource to some local supplier? This idea will be developed in another paper.
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326 Appendix
A1 Cost Minimization Problem In order to ￿nd the equilibrium operating pro￿ts, we solve



























2 = x(v)a(1 ￿ ￿)(d￿)
￿






2 + f(d) + fM (33)
=x(v)a(d￿)
￿ + f(d) + fM
Using (33) inside (6) it is possible to derive an expression for the multinational equilibrium pro￿ts,






￿ ￿ f(d) ￿ fM (34)










Equations (34) and (35) refers to this speci￿c multinational framework; the problem above can
be solved for each di⁄erent type of ￿rm. More generically, the ￿nal good producer will choose
the supply mode that maximizes ￿￿
k(a;A;￿) where k = M; X or D: For this reason, ￿nal good
producers organize the production so as to minimize both variable and ￿xed costs.







in relation to the degree of trade openness. In particular, when ￿ = 0:9
while when ￿ = 0:2, its behavior is the following:
34